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BOOK REVIEWS
Gary C. Kessler
Editor
Champlain College
Burlington, VT 05401
gary.kessler@champlain.edu
INTRODUCTION
This is the Book Review column for the JDFSL. It is an experiment to broaden
the services that the journal provides to readers, so we are anxious to get your
reaction. Is the column useful and interesting? Should we include more than
one review per issue? Should we also review products? Do you have suggested
books/products for review and/or do you want to write a review? All of this
type of feedback -- and more -- is appreciated. Please feel free to send
comments to Gary Kessler (gary.kessler@champlain.edu) or Glenn Dardick
(gdardick@dardick.net).
BOOK REVIEW
Libicki, M.C. (2007). Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and
Information Warfare. New York: Cambridge University Press. 323 pages,
ISBN: 978-0-521-69214-4 (paper), US$80
Reviewed by Gary C. Kessler (gary.kessler@champlain.edu)
Many books -- and even movies ("Live Free or Die Hard") -- are based upon
the premise of an impending information war. In these scenarios -- made all
too plausible by the increased frequency with which we read about and
experience major information security incidents -- a Bad Guy exploits known
computer security vulnerabilities in order to control major national
infrastructures via the Internet so as to reap financial, economic, and/or
personal power.
Martin Libicki's book takes a different, broader, and possibly more realistic
view of the classic infowar scenario. Libicki -- a senior policy analyst at the
RAND Corp. -- argues that hostile conquest of the global network is not as big
a threat as some believe because of the incredible difficulty to taking control of
information systems owned by others, corrupting their data, and/or shutting
those systems down. He also argues that the globally connected cyberspace
presents an excellent opportunity to drive the actions and attitudes of others.
This is not a head-in-the-sand analysis that suggests that cyberattacks are not
possible; Libicki's premise is more about the practicality and efficacy of such
efforts and, therefore, the book is about policy as much as it is about
technology. The Internet was developed as the result of U.S. Department of
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Defense (DoD) research efforts yet has realized its greatest success as means
for peaceful commerce and personal intercourse. Its success is the very reason
that we even think of the possible impact of hostile actions that might occur.
Yet this book is very clearly about hostile conquest in -- rather than of -cyberspace, suggesting that while isolated attacks within the Internet can and
do occur, what do such attacks mean to the physical world?
Chapter 1 sets the stage and describes the loose organization of the three parts
of book. Part I is comprised of four chapters that discuss hostile conquest. One
basic premise is that computer systems, by and large, generate information so
that humans can make decisions. Despite the number of automated processes,
the claim here is that there are very few systems that are so automated and
autonomous as to have taken humans out of the decision loop.
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of hostile attacks via cyberspace. The DoD did
not really start to think of the Internet as an attack vector -- i.e., one to be
utilized and defended -- until the 1990s. If the Internet represents the Global
Information Age then it becomes a valuable asset for military organizations
that depend so heavily upon information. Although information operations for
both defense and offense is taken seriously by the DoD, it does not necessarily
follow that actual conquest of an enemy can be accomplished via cyberspace.
Indeed, an attack on information systems is not the same as an attack on the
information stored on those systems.
Chapter 3 is aptly titled "Information Warfare as Noise." If information is
signal, then an attack on information is noise. While error is to believe
something to be true that is, in fact, actually false -- or vice versa -- noise is to
not know that the something is even known. If an attacker throws a lot of bad
information at an adversary, the response will be to make decisions more
slowly and deliberately, perhaps drawing on multiple sources for validation.
While noise, then, can complicate decision-making, it is not a vector for taking
over control of information systems. Furthermore, the design and purpose of
the target systems has a direct impact on how noise-tolerant they are and how
"well" they fail, and this also affects the difficulty of any attack on those
systems.
Chapter 4 discusses infowar against defense systems. The primary point of this
chapter is that it is impossible to state with certainty whether an information
warfare attack would -- or would not -- succeed. Even though system
vulnerabilities abound that allow an attacker to get into other people's systems
and wreak havoc, there is no attack vector that will always work and be
consistently repeatable. Chapter 5 finishes off this part of the book by
questioning the premise that infowar is about destroying information. Indeed,
one information warfare attack vector might be to inundate an adversary with
worthless information. Information overload is not conquest although the
varying strategies with which an adversary copes with the situation can
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certainly be disabling -- for some period of time and/or in some sectors.
Indeed, that hesitation can enable physical conquest but the point is really that
cyberspace-based conquest alone is harder than it looks.
The next two chapters comprise Part II, describing friendly conquest in
cyberspace. Friendly conquest, as described in Chapter 6, focuses on allies,
neutrals, and those that are not enemies and suggests that if owners of
information systems freely and reliably share information, others eventually
grow dependent upon those systems. Over time, the relationship between the
users and owners of the information resource become intertwined and a
symbiotic -- if not friendly, at least not adversarial -- relationship emerges.
Chapter 7 shows how this relationship can expand beyond mere access to
information, to include merging and bundling other systems, from financial
and educational to social and cultural. One could argue that the Internet has
already fostered some level of friendly conquests merely by allowing
individuals to communicate more freely and widely than ever before; friendly
conquests are also longer lasting and more solid than hostile ones.
Part III, comprising the final four chapters, observes that hostile and friendly
conquest might actually go hand-in-hand -- and, in fact, friendly conquest can
ease the road of hostile conquest.
Chapter 8 starts by discussing the vast quantity of personal information that is
collected on just about every citizen and the myriad ways in which the
custodians of that data protect or outright abuse the information in their care.
Although the Internet can be used for all sorts of invasions of privacy,
surveillance, and data mining (particularly as information becomes
increasingly global), Libicki questions the long-term consequence as relates to
hostile conquest. Indeed, digital signatures, virtual private networks (VPNs),
and security features of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) might actually see
more widespread use if there continue to be egregious attacks on identity. And
although there are vast resources on the Internet that support physical world
reconnaissance that might expedite real world attacks, this does not enable
conquest in cyberspace.
Friendly conquest requires not only the sharing of information between
mutually dependent parties, but also trust between those parties. As Chapter 9
points out, such partnerships have their own special vulnerabilities. The
closeness, for example, can make all partners prone to the system or policy
weaknesses introduced by one party. In addition, an adversary of the partners
can inject information into the common system in such a way as to create an
atmosphere of distrust, eventually weakening the union.
Chapter 10 describes conquest in cyberspace in terms of human language;
namely, phonology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. This is a very
interesting take on the problem but demonstrates nicely that any conquest -any significant activity, for that matter -- is complex and requires action at
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many levels, be they human communication or computer communication. The
particular point of this chapter is that both friendly and hostile conquest
requires action at all levels and the complexity of the interactions between
levels can both enable and frustrate such activities.
Chapter 11, "Managing Conquest in Cyberspace," closes out the body of the
book and is devoted to the role of government and organizations in protecting
their part of cyberspace to ward off hostile intent and how to extend their
sphere of influence to exact friendly conquest. A fair amount of this chapter is
a critique of Microsoft and Windows, a case study of attack vectors warranted
by their dominance in the computer industry.
This book is very well-written, incredibly well-documented (the footnotes
alone are worth reading), and compelling. We have been so inundated with the
message that information warfare is possible and downright impending that it
is beneficial to read a well-reasoned alternate perspective. Libicki provides a
knowledgeable, broad look at the big picture and makes a good argument that
the situation is a different, more complex one than we may have been
discussing.
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